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WHAT PLACE HAS AN EMIGRATION PAST  
IN AN IMMIGRATION PRESENT?  










 Nel diciannovesimo e ventesimo secolo milioni di Irlandesi e di Italiani 
emigrarono verso diversi paesi del mondo alla ricerca di una vita migliore. Le 
persone che hanno lasciato i confini irlandesi sono stati spesso rappresentati 
come esuli dallo stato irlandese, e costantemente commemorati in coerenza 
con le tradizionali idee nazionaliste irlandesi. Diversamente, l’Italia non 
disponeva di una simile narrativa coloniale a cui far riferimento, e dunque lo 
stato italiano era riluttante a commemorare un passato di emigrazione che 
dimostrava l’incapacità dello stato a provvedere alle necessità dei suoi 
cittadini. Ironicamente, questa distinzione è diventata percettibile nei dibattiti 
contemporanei sull’immigrazione. In Irlanda, nei primi dibattiti  che hanno 
avuto luogo tra la metà e la fine degli anni ’90, gli attori pro-immigrazione 
hanno evocato in maniera costante la memoria della passata emigrazione 
irlandese, per indurre nei nativi irlandesi compassione verso i nuovi arrivati. 
Questa narrativa è stata tuttavia invocata meno frequentemente negli anni più 
recenti, da quando la compassione per gli immigrati è iniziata a declinare. In 
Italia, la storia di emigrazione del paese si è fatta notare soprattutto per 
l’assenza dai dibattiti sull’immigrazione. Quello che entrambi i casi dimostrano 





Millions of Irish and Italians migrated throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries to countries all over the world in search of a better 
life. The Irish state, through constant commemoration, often 
represented Irish emigrants as exiles escaping colonialism and its 
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legacy. In addition to embracing this official version, the popular 
memory of migration often associated the emigrant experience with 
economic struggle. Both memories invited frequent comparisons to 
others that had suffered similar imperial and economic difficulties. By 
contrast, the Italian state had no nationalist narrative to call upon to 
explain the massive exodus from its lands1. The state remained 
reluctant to commemorate the country’s emigrant past because most 
people actually left in order to attain an adequate standard of living the 
Italian state was unable to underwrite. Though the national memory of 
migration was weak, a popular memory still existed; but this focused 
predominantly on the Italian state’s failure to support the plight of its 
citizens abroad. Unlike Ireland’s archive of suffering, which was open 
to all who could relate to the Irish experience, the Italian archive could 
only be referenced by Italians.  Ironically, these distinctions became 
discernible in the first immigration debates that took place in both 
countries in the 1990s. In Ireland, pro-migrant actors consistently 
evoked the memory of past Irish emigration to induce sympathy 
amongst natives for newcomers. By contrast, references to Italy’s 
migration past – of emigration and internal migration – were 
conspicuous only by their near-absence from immigration debates.  
 To expound and justify these assertions, this article is split into 
three parts. First, the scale of emigration that occurred from these two 
countries will be briefly highlighted. The second section will seek to 
discover what memory of migration developed in Ireland and Italy and 
why. The last section will discuss what impact the memory of 
migration – or its absence – had on immigration debates in Ireland and 
Italy.  
 
                                                 
1  Apart from government-supported emigration to Italy’s colonies during fascism; an 
experience post-war Italy anxiously tried to forget.   
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Emigration   
 
To give an indication of the influence emigration had on Irish and 
Italian societies, this section focuses briefly on the extent of the 
departure. Between 1850 and 1913, over 4.5 million Irish people left 
their homeland for North America, England and Australia. As a 
consequence, the island’s population dropped by almost a third 
(Hatton & Williamson 1993:575). Though Italy’s population steadily 
increased from 27.6 to 35.7 million between 1871 and 1911 (Del 
Panta 1996:134), it did so without over 13 million Italians, who left 
their country of birth between 1876 and 1914 (Rossoli 1978:345).  
 For many Irish people, the Famine represented the final ultimatum 
before deciding to leave their homeland. Declining demand for 
agricultural labour and the fall of Irish wages in comparison with the 
United States inclined millions to follow the Famine exodus (Doyle 
2007:213). Men and women left in approximately equal numbers and, 
perhaps as a consequence, few returned (Hatton & Williamson 
1998:76 and 84).  
 Italy had a large population surplus in the late nineteenth century, 
with demand often outweighing supply. To escape the growing 
poverty, many chose to leave their homeland for Europe and the 
Americas. At the turn of the twentieth century, the promise of earning 
high wages meant that many turned to North America. While 
emigration from northern Italy to neighbouring European countries 
and South America had dominated emigration in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, in the first quarter of the twentieth century most 
emigrants hailed from southern Italy.  
 Though the southern part of Ireland achieved its independence 
from British rule in 1922, people of all religious persuasions 
continued to depart. Many moved to Britain because of America’s 
decision to enact a number of restrictions on immigration. From 1945 
onwards, post-war Britain offered another pull factor. Not only did the 
country need migrants to fill labour shortages after the Second World 
War but Attlee’s Labour government initiated a generous and 
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comprehensive welfare system. Emigration from Ireland only stalled 
in the 1970s because of the relative modernisation of the Irish 
economy following decades of isolationist policies (Foster 2007:7-36). 
Despite emigration reoccurring in the 1980s, Ireland received a net 
inflow of migrants from the early 1990s onwards.  
 Emigration from Italy recommenced following the First World 
War, but it never reached the heights of pre-war days. New American 
immigration restrictions introduced also limited Italian migrants’ 
options considerably. Simultaneously, analogous developments took 
place across most of Europe, to be followed later by Brazil and 
Argentina as global economic depression set in after the 1929 Great 
Wall Street Crash. In the early 1920s Mussolini had seen emigration 
as a remedy for unemployment and as a way of spreading fascism 
throughout the world (Fortier 2000:71) but by the late 1920s it became 
illegal, concluding what Ipsen (1996:62) termed ‘the Fascist transition 
from emigration encouragement to tolerance to repression’. A 
noticeable exception was emigration to Italy’s colonies, which the 
regime still promoted. 
 After the fall of fascism and the end of the Second World War, 
emigration began to reoccur; though it again failed to reach the peak 
of a half-century before. Indeed, many of the emigrants that went to 
neighbouring European countries after the Second World War later 
returned to Italy’s “economic miracle”, which began in the 1950s. 
Significant economic growth in Italy actually led to approximately 
nine million people migrating within the country from the 1950s to 
1970s (Ginsborg 1990:219). Most transferred from rural areas – the 
South, the islands and the Veneto region – to industrial cities located 
predominantly in the North and especially Turin, Genoa and Milan 
(Alasi & Montaldi 1975:30-1). From the 1970s, Italy began to receive 
a positive net inflow of migrants made up predominantly of returning 
migrants, although some foreign migrants also arrived.  
 The scale of emigration that occurred – and internal migration in 
the case of Italy – was enormous. But what memory did this produce 
and why?  
 138 
 
What past for the present? 
 
Pierre Nora (1989:8) stated that memory is “vulnerable to 
manipulation and appropriation”. Bal (1999:vii) concurred: memory, 
in his opinion, could be invoked “to mediate and modify difficult or 
tabooed moments of the past”. Wertsch (2002:67) believes the modern 
state, with its hegemonic capacity to control many of the resources 
involved in remembering, is particularly adept at providing its 
members with certain accounts of the past. As Aleida Assmann 
(2006:216) affirms, states do not ‘have’ a memory, they ‘make’ a 
memory with the aid of symbols, texts, images, rites, ceremonies, 
places, and monuments. Such a political memory is based on selection 
and exclusion, especially if it means stabilizing and unifying a certain 
memory to promote the state’s own goals (Phillips 2004:8).  This 
section will try to discover what memory of migration the Irish and 
Italian states attempted to transmit to their citizens and why? It will 
also seek to determine how this political memory of migration was 
received. Confino (1999:1397) has remarked that memory 
commingles with, and is dependent on, its reception; hence it is 
important to ask what memory of migration Irish and Italian people 
habitually shared amongst their peers via different forms of oral 




Irish secular and religious leaders throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries regularly blamed continuous emigration on British 
rule. This association tallied well with the traditional interpretation 
that had long existed in Irish lore linking emigration with exile (Miller 
1990:93). Of course, by constantly commemorating Ireland’s Famine 
emigrants, the state had a perfect medium to transmit such a memory. 
Yet the majority of post-Famine emigrants left voluntarily; no one 
forced them to depart.  Nonetheless, the image of involuntary 
 139
departure “remained prevalent, still colouring the letters and memoirs 
of ordinary Catholic emigrants as well as songs and ballads, political 
speeches, and clerical sermons” (Miller:92). For Irish political leaders, 
such as Daniel O’Connell in the 1830s, John Mitchel in the 1850s, 
Charles Stewart Parnell in the 1890s and Padraig Pearse in the 1910s – 
to name but a few – this account went hand in hand with 
contemporaneous nationalist sentiments.  
 In the decades after the Free State gained its independence in 1922, 
this myth was open to scrutiny because of continuing emigration from 
the country to England, especially in the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, one 
commentator observed in 1953 that if emigration continued, the “Irish 
will virtually disappear as a nation and will be found only as an 
enervated remnant in a land occupied by foreigners” (O’Brien 1953, 
quoted in Delaney 1998:42). Seen with such trepidation, emigration 
understandably became the source of vigorous political debate in the 
country. This was augmented further by the Irish Catholic Church’s 
concern for the fact that women made up the majority of those leaving 
(Daly 2006). Often, politicians and church leaders sought to reverse 
emigration by implying that it represented a sort of national betrayal, 
with Eamon De Valera, the Prime Minister at the time, observing in 
1951 that “not only did they [emigrants] fail to improve their own 
circumstances by going abroad, but they leave enterprises for the 
development of our national resources without sufficient labour to 
enable progress to be made as rapidly as we would desire” (Gavin 
2002:157)2. Fintan O’Toole believes that it was only when the 
American president, John F. Kennedy, came to Ireland in the early 
1960s that the negative connotation associated with emigration from 
Ireland after independence disappeared. Kennedy represented the 
positive side of emigration; the emigrant made good. He proudly told 
his Irish audience in June 1963: “Most countries send out oil, iron, 
steel or gold, some other crops, but Ireland has only one export and 
that is people (O’Toole 1997:52). As O’Toole surmised, Kennedy 
                                                 
2  The first was untrue, the second negligible. 
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allowed Irish people to embrace their emigrant past rather than 
overlook it:  
 
[Kennedy: ] ‘I wonder before I go, if I could find out how 
many citizens here have relations in the United States? 
Do you think you could hold up your hands if you do?’ 
[…] For decades these people in these crowds had 
listened to politicians and churchmen talking about the 
disgrace, the shame, the scandal of emigration […] In the 
unseemly rush to claim Kennedy, we also had to claim all 
those other scattered families or ours, inglorious and 
unglamorous as they were. Those arms that reached out 
to him also had to grab a painful history […] We faced 
the world thereafter with less innocence, less gullibility, 
more confidence and more clarity. (O’Toole 1997:50) 
 
In the ensuing decades, emigration from Ireland manifested itself in a 
particular form of Irishness, associated with both colonial and 
economic hardship. As Gray (2002:131) illustrated, the Famine 
migrants, through constant state commemoration, became the 
“‘authentic’ Irish migrants, the traumatic, but genuine origin of ‘Irish 
emigration’”. Perhaps reflecting the impact this had on the Irish 
character, one need look no further than Ireland’s most popular song, 
The Fields of Athenry. Composed in the 1970s, it is still sung today at 
a variety of local, provincial and international sporting events 
involving Irish and Irish-linked teams. Fittingly, it recounts the exile 
of an Irishman during the Famine and his banishment from his 
beloved homeland: “For you stole Trevelyan’s3 corn/So the young 
might see the morn/Now a prison ship lies waiting in the bay/ Low lie 
the Fields of Athenry/Where once we watched the small free birds 
fly”.  
                                                 
3  Charles Edward Trevelyan was the Assistant Secretary to the British Treasury from 1840 to 
1859 and was in charge of the administration charged with providing relief to the victims of 
the Irish Famine (1845-1849). 
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Nonetheless, popular culture also focused on the poverty and 
destitution that prompted many Irish migrants to leave and compared 
it to the arduous experiences of others elsewhere, especially Africans 
and African-Americans. The Irish felt they could relate to the 
oppressed and the hungry everywhere because of their own 
experiences. In the words of the novelist Roddy Doyle: it was simple, 
“The Irish were the Blacks of Europe” (Doyle 1987). Extending this 
theme, Bono, the lead singer of U2 and the so-called ‘white nigger’, 
wrote: “The Irish, like the blacks, feel like outsiders. There’s a feeling 
of being homeless, migrant […]” (Hewson 1988). In the 1990s, this 
approach was given further leverage by the Irish president, Mary 
Robinson. Speaking at a commemoration to Famine migrants in 
Canada, she told listeners: “as a people who suffered and survived 
[…] our history does not entitle us to a merely private catalogue of 
memories” (Gray 2002:131). The implication was clear: the Irish, 
because of their own traumatic experiences, had to relate their own 
memories of past injustices with contemporary ones around the world. 
   
Italy 
 
Though negative stereotyping of Italians abroad, especially in the 
United States – where Italians were often linked to criminality – 
inclined the Italian state to ignore rather than to celebrate its citizens 
abroad, the most significant reason for the state’s failure to 
sufficiently honour its emigrant past related to its own central role in 
the experience. To commemorate the country’s emigration history was 
to commemorate the state’s failure to provide for its people. Unlike in 
Ireland, there was no nationalist myth to employ. Instead, it was clear 
to all that Italians left in an attempt to attain what the Italian state 
failed to bestow: an adequate living for all its citizens. As Negri 
(1997:44) records, the emigrant population was “defeated in the 
struggle to gain land, to improve its lot, to pursue that little bit of 
happiness that represents one of the great founding tenets of 
democracy”. In order to avoid self-criticism, the Italian state seemed 
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to avoid remembering the country’s long, often traumatic emigration 
history; thereby creating a weak national memory of emigration in the 
process. The Italian state’s continuous disinclination to officially 
remember the plight of millions of its emigrants has meant that the 
Italian memory of emigration has been largely carried out in private. 
As one Italian politician recently surmised:  
 
The migration experience of Italians has not yet been 
elaborated in the collective culture, there is not even a 
collection of experiences in the reconstructed 
historiography, nor have memories, images, symbols 
been produced. One remembers only the grind; the 
private adventure has not been integrated into our 
national history, it does not make up part of our 
collective ethos, it does not feed the public feeling and 
ethic. (Turco 2005:11) 
  
Whilst many Irish songs and poems lamented leaving their beloved 
land, Italian equivalents often used their grief to bemoan the Italian 
state. As one traditional song recalled, the feeling amongst emigrants 
was often hostile to the Italian state: “Damn Italy, let’s get outta 
here”4. Theirs was not a victim diaspora, like the nationalist myth 
surrounding Irish emigration. Furthermore, because the majority of 
Italian emigrants left in the decades following the largely artificial 
unification of the country, many felt muted emotional attachment to a 
state that meant little to them (Guglielmo & Salerno 2003:10). 
“Italianità”, according to Gabaccia (2003:77), “reside[d] in the 
humble details of everyday life, not in the glories of any nation or its 
state”. Mussolini’s attempts to change this led to the establishment of 
various fasci (social clubs) dotted throughout the diasporic world, but 
these closed down soon after Mussolini’s fall from power (Fortier 
2000:74). 
                                                 
4  Campagne venete, taken from Gabbacia 2003:58. 
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 After the Second World War, successive governments, led by the 
Christian Democrats, saw emigration as offering a viable solution to 
the country’s unemployment and underemployment problems 
(Colucci 2002:599). This in turn led the Italian government to 
negotiate a number of bilateral deals with other European states. 
Nevertheless, many emigrants felt that the state’s interest in their well-
being ended when they crossed the Italian border into another country. 
While the unions, the Church and close knit communities from home 
were often there to guide emigrants abroad, the state played little or no 
role in their daily lives, leading many emigrants’ memories to be 
marked with a certain mistrust of Italian institutions (Colucci 
2002:603). This displeasure manifested itself in protests after the 
Marcinelle mining disaster in Belgium in 1956, when 136 Italian 
miners lost their lives. Italy had signed a deal with Belgium in 1946 so 
that it received cheap coal in exchange for a steady flow of Italian 
mineworkers but Italian emigrants felt they received nothing from the 
state in return.  As one song declared, the state was only interested in 
emigrants’ remittances; not their health: “L’emigrante ha salvato la 
lira/lavorando in terra straniera/ma il governo italiano ci spera. Non 
appena passò la frontiera/si può essere offesi e insultati/o morire in 
miniera ammazzati. Il governo italiano ha interesse/solamente alle 
nostre rimesse”5 (Colucci 2002:601).  
 Internal Italian migrants experienced similar difficulties to 
emigrants when they moved from rural areas in the South and 
northeast to northern industrial cities in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Approximately 20 percent (Fofi 1964:9) of the Italian population 
migrated from one region to another during the ‘economic miracle’, 
where they subsequently encountered problems analogous to those of 
Italian emigrants abroad. They frequently worked illegally, often in 
hazardous conditions, and the persistent application of fascist laws 
                                                 
5  A rough translation might read, ‘The emigrant has saved his lira/working in a foreign 
land/but the Italian government leaves him. Just when he has passed the border/he can be 
offended and insulted/or die in a mine. The Italian government is interested/only in our 
remittances’.  
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against urbanisation hampered their search for accommodation until 
the late 1950s, leading many to build their own housing (Alasia & 
Montaldi 1975:29-30). Migrants, especially from the South, also 
suffered considerable discrimination from locals because of their 
perceived differences (Fofi 1964:251).  
 The state was seen by many to be an uninterested bystander in the 
affairs of migrants within the state and abroad. Accordingly, Italians 
often associated migration with a negative connotation of Italy, thus 
contributing to the already sizeable nativist archive of dissatisfaction 
amongst Italians towards the Italian state.  
 With Italy’s rapid move towards modernization in the late 1950s 
and 1960s, Martelli (2001:476) surmised that images associating the 
country with poverty and suffering became unwelcome in Italian 
society. Thus the thousands of emigrants that returned to Italy in the 
1960s and 1970s often had to withhold any memories of financial 
hardship they envisaged whilst abroad. This aversion to evoking 
images of Italy’s poorer past continued into the 1990s. As Campani 
(1993) argued, Italy is now a fully fledged modern Western nation that 
has left aside its potential role as a mediator between South and North, 
based on its Mediterranean identity and geography6. Though several 
filmmakers, novelists, academics and new emigrant museums have 
since captured the experiences of Italian migrants, comparisons 
between Italians’ arduous experiences and those of others were rare. 
As a result, the memory of migration in Italy rarely led to collective 
feelings of camaraderie and understanding with any non-Italians.  
 
                                                 
6  Campani (1993: 532) states that there was a “conception of Italy as a mediator between the 
North and the South (especially between North Africa and Europe) inside a Mediterranean 
space, corresponding to a long history of exchange and to possession of a common culture 
[…] but now it has been rejected in parallel with Italy’s alignment with the western world, 
after a long period of popular mobilization and struggle”. 
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Changing Identities: From out-migration to in-migration 
 
Today, Ireland’s immigration population stands at nearly half a 
million (CSO 2007) – or approximately 10 percent of the Irish 
population; Italy’s immigrant population measures between 3.5 
million and 4 million (Caritas 2008) – or between 5.8 and 6.6 percent 
of the Italian population. Public, political and media opposition to 
certain groups of migrants, based on perceived cultural, physical and 
economic threats, quickly became apparent in both countries after the 
arrival of significant numbers of immigrants. To offset such 
resistance, pro-migrant actors used a mixture of moral, communitarian 
and humanitarian rationales to evoke empathy amongst natives for 
these newcomers in both countries. Pro-migrant actors in Ireland also 
used the memory of past Irish emigrants to invoke empathy with 
asylum seekers – the main targets of anti-immigrant hostility. By 
implying that they shared a common experience, Irish people were 
made to feel they had a moral debt or responsibility to help these 
people (Gray 2004:9). In contrast, comparisons between “clandestini” 
– the targets of the majority of anti-immigrant vitriol in Italy – and 
former Italian emigrants were seldom made by pro-migrant actors, 
even though it could be argued that they shared much in common. 
Later debates in both countries, however, were to reveal the fragile 
nature of memories based on compassion and understanding with 
others.   
 A large number of non-Irish migrants accompanied returning Irish 
emigrants when the Irish economic boom began in the mid 1990s. 
Most of the arrivals came with work permits or applied for asylum. 
While the country only had to contend with thirty-nine asylum 
applications in 1992, by 1997 this had risen to nearly four thousand 
before reaching its crescendo of almost twelve thousand in 2001. This 
massive increase represented, according to one journalist, the largest 
influx of those seeking shelter in the country since ‘the Celts were 
driven west by the Romans’ (Cullen 1997:11). The fact that it took an 
average of two years to deal with every asylum case – because the 
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system in place dealt normally with only thirty to sixty cases a year – 
meant that a huge backlog in applications rapidly amassed. Because 
the state had a responsibility to house, feed and provide for these 
asylum seekers – who were barred from employment during the 
application procedure – a noticeable surge in public, political and 
media opposition to asylum seekers became discernible. To counter 
this hostility, pro-migrant actors frequently referenced past Irish 
emigrants in an attempt to evoke compassion with asylum seekers. 
This rhetoric initially met with much resonance amongst the public, 
politicians and the media alike; before weakening as opposition to 
asylum seekers increased.  
 In the first meaningful debate on asylum in 1995, one politician 
commented: “[T]he status of refugees is an issue which should strike a 
chord with every man, woman and child here who has any grasp of 
Irish history, our history books being littered with the names and 
deeds of those driven from our country out of fear of persecution” 
(O’Donogue 1995, cited in King 2002:202). Three years later, when 
the very same politician attempted to introduce more restrictive 
asylum policies in his new role as Justice Minister, various politicians 
again referenced Ireland’s own migration heritage. One stated that 
Ireland’s “history requires us to be generous and just” (McManus 
1998), while another attacked the government’s policy on similar but 
more explicit grounds:  
 
We are showing a version of ourselves that is depressing 
and mean. I imagine there is more decency in ordinary 
Irish people who, as already stated, have the ethic of 
memory. Most families in Ireland have relatives who 
went abroad […] and they want to see the emergence of a 
kind of dignity and solidarity. (Higgins 1998, emphasis 
added) 
 
A 2000 survey seemed to indicate that these metaphors between 
Ireland’s past emigrants and more recent immigrants affected public 
 147
opinion somewhat: sixty percent agreed that a more generous 
approach ought to have been taken with asylum seekers because of 
Ireland’s history of emigration and their current prosperity (Rafter 
2000:1). But the reaction to another question in the same survey 
highlighted the ambiguous nature of Irish attitudes towards asylum 
seekers, as 74 percent of those questioned stated their preference for a 
strict limit to be placed on the number of asylum seekers allowed into 
the country. In line with growing resentment towards asylum seekers, 
references to Irish emigrants became less habitual. Those in favour of 
restricting asylum numbers actually began to alter the memory of Irish 
migrants to coincide with this mounting intolerance for asylum 
seekers. Irish emigrants, they remarked, never scrounged off receiver 
states like asylum seekers: they worked hard. The contraposition to 
asylum seekers, who were disallowed from working by the state while 
their application was under consideration and hence had to live off 
state benefits, was obvious. The memory of the past, it seemed, could 
always be tailored to suit the present. As Kendal Phillips (2004:4) 
remarked, “If the existence of a healthy and functioning public is 
intertwined with its capacity for remembrance, then the gradual 
erosion by forgetting must represent a grave danger”.  
 In direct contrast to Ireland, pro-migrant actors in Italy rarely 
alluded to Italy’s rich migration history in immigration debates due to 
the imperceptible political memory of migration in Italy and the 
exclusive nature of Italians’ memories of migration. Instead of 
underlining parallels between immigrants and Italians, politicians 
stressed the disparities between the two – a development that would 
become more even more evident after the collapse of the Italian 
Communist Party and the Christian Democrats. 
 The Italian Communist Party had adopted, included and eventually 
integrated many of the southern Italian migrants who moved to 
northern Italy in the 1950s and 1960s under the rubric of class struggle 
and socioeconomic justice. But its inability to attain power in the 
1970s and 1980s and its ultimate demise in early 1991, after the fall of 
communism in Europe, meant this never occurred with foreign 
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migrants in Italy in the 1990s and 2000s. As Pero noted, whilst the 
Communist Party’s successors’ rhetoric remained inclusive, its 
practices were frequently exclusive (Pero 2007).  
 The Christian Democrats reaction to immigrants was hazy, as was 
demonstrated by its reaction to the two waves of Albanian migration 
to Italy in spring of 1991 and August 1991. After days of indecision, 
the first influx, measuring approximately 26,000, received temporary 
visas and Giulio Andreotti, the leader of the government at the time, 
asked Italians to follow his own personal example by symbolically 
adopting Albanians. As one of Andreotti’s colleagues in the Christian 
Democrat party explained to parliament, these newcomers shared 
several traits with Italians:  
 
Attention must be drawn also to another fact: those who 
disembark in Italy [...] even in their weakness, even in 
their fragility, even in their destitute appearance, are 
people with their own families, who in fact have a culture 
[culto] of family, who love their own land, who have a 
tradition, a history of utmost respect that has many 
similarities to our history and our traditions. (Piccoli 
1991) 
 
But this sympathetic attitude towards the Albanians, and immigrants 
more generally, began to slowly digress over the ensuing months as 
public opposition to immigration grew. Opinion polls released several 
months after the first Albanian incident seemed to reflect the growing 
enmity to immigrants in the country, with La Repubblica arguing that 
the ‘Albanian effect’ had helped to increase public opposition to 
immigrants compared to previous years (Bonerandi 1991:20). Much 
of this resistance related to Italians’ fear of immigrants. As one expert 
recorded, 55.4 percent of Italians surveyed felt that there was a clear 
correlation between increasing criminality and the rise in the numbers 
of immigrants (Bonifazi 1998:225).  In response, the Christian 
Democrat-led government adopted a markedly tougher stance when 
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almost 20,000 Albanians sailed (most of whom were on board the 
Vlora) into Bari on 8 August 1991. 
 The state immediately classified the situation as a military and 
police problem rather than a humanitarian one (Ruggeri 1991:3). In 
complete contrast to the first Albanian incident, Italian police and 
military forced the Albanians into Bari’s football stadium for several 
days before forcefully expatriating them. The disparity of the political 
responses to the two Albanian episodes was astonishing. In the wake 
of such a contrasting reaction to the two Albanian incidents, one 
journalist felt compelled to ask:  
 
What kind of a strange country is this? It is a country in 
which the government, personified by the President of 
the Council first symbolically adopts three young 
Albanian refugees and then locks 16,000 people in a 
concentration camp for three days without water and 
food. […] someone still has to find the courage to explain 
to Albanians, and to Italians, if this is really a country of 
fairytales in which three desperate people can become 
sons of the head of government or whether it is an 
inferno that should not be approached. (Palombelli 
1991:1) 
 
Even though the Christian Democrats had reacted so harshly to the 
second Albanian incident, some empathy still existed within the party 
to the plight of migrants because of the party’s links to the Catholic 
Church, which consistently voiced its support for migrants. Yet, this 
capacity diminished over the ensuing years as Italy experienced its 
biggest political crisis since the birth of the post-war Republic. The 
corruption scandal that came to be known as Tangentopoli (roughly 
translated as ‘Bribesville’) inclined many of the country’s most 
famous political figures to vanish from politics, along with the parties 
they represented, including the Christian Democrats, the Socialist 
Party, the Italian Republican Party, the Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party and the Liberal Party.  
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 Those parties that stepped into the political vacuum Tangentopoli 
created, such as the neo-fascist Alleanza Nazionale (AN)7, the 
amalgamated Lega Nord and, to a lesser extent, the newly formed 
Forza Italia, would bring the issue of immigration to the fore of 
public debate from the mid 1990s onwards, and especially in the run-
up to the 2001 and 2008 general elections. These parties repeatedly 
focused on the physical and cultural threats they claimed immigrants 
posed to Italian society. Though several figures from AN and Forza 
Italia acknowledged Italy’s emigrant past, they never related this often 
traumatic experience to the similar predicaments contemporary 
migrants in Italy habitually faced, as concerns over security and 





Buonfino has recounted how Italian politicians from the AN and 
Forza Italia frequently differentiated between Italian emigrants of 
yesterday and migrants in Italy today by describing the former as 
‘entrepreneurs’, ‘skilled’ migrants and ‘hard working’ people, and the 
latter as ‘lazy’, ‘criminals’, and ‘illegals’ (Buonfino 2004:22). In 
recent years, Irish politicians have begun to display similar sentiments 
as public hostility towards asylum seekers has mounted. Retaining a 
vivid memory of migration is therefore not emblematic of avoiding 
the build-up of anti-migrant sentiments amongst politicians, publics 
and media alike. Nonetheless, it is a useful tool for pro-migrant actors 
to employ in immigration debates to counteract the rise of antipathy 
towards migrants. Comparing newcomers to natives can harbour 
feelings of solidarity and similitude between the two when the 
national memory of migration is strong and inclusive, as the Irish case 
displayed. Conversely, when a weak and exclusive memory of 
                                                 
7  The Alleanza Nazionale (AN) replaced the Movimento Sociale Italiano. In doing so, the 
party’s vote increased from 5.9 percent in 1987 to 12.7 in 1994 (Martini 1994:5). 
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migration hinders pro-migrant actors from emphasising similarities 
between natives and newcomers, anti-immigrant rhetoric highlighting 
the inherent physical and cultural differences between the two instead 
becomes more widespread. This in turn leads to the growth in 
popularity of anti-immigrant political parties and the gradual adoption 
of more hard-line views on immigration among mainstream parties, as 
the Italian case is demonstrating all too vividly today. 
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